



University of California at Santa Barbara 
In "Is Animal Pain Conscious?," Joseph Lynch sustains 
the thesis that animals feel pain and aptly counters the 
contentions of Carrutllers and Harrison that they do not. 
Since I am in broad agreement with Prof. Lynch's 
clearly argued paper, I will confine myself to some 
comments on me positions of Carruthers and Harrison, 
and a small modification to Prof. Lynch's argument. 
Joseph Lynch rightly attacks the uses of the terms 
"conscious" and "unconscious" (or "non-conscious" in 
Carruthers' case) by both Cartesian authors, and it is to 
this area of the controversy that I wish to tum. Lynch 
notes, for example, that "Carruthers' account [demands 
that] ... conscious states must be available for thought, 
every conscious state requires higher-order intentional 
mentality. And Carruthers takes it as axiomatic that 
animals could neither have beliefs or thoughts about 
their experience." Lynch then goes on to claim-again, 
correctly, I believe-that "[t]heir [Carruthers' and 
Harrison's] arguments depend largely upon moving 
from the conceivability of some unconscious pain to 
the claim that animal pain in general must be 
unconscious. But the mere possibility that we can 
account for some pain as a type of unconscious 
perception is not sufficient to establish that animal pain 
is most plausibly interpreted in this way." Lynch's 
strategy is to show that Harrison and Carrutllers are 
wrong by pointing out that the arguments in favor of 
the notion that animals do experience pain are, 
collectively and cumulatively quite strong, even if none 
of them is as strong individually as we might like. 
While agreeing with Prof. Lynch, my contention is 
that he is a bit too ready to accept the rather odd use of 
terminology in which Carruthers and Harrison indulge, 
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and that it might make for a stronger argument to clarify 
the terminology and make appropriate distinctions. This 
Lynch does do to some extent; I would push this further. 
The use of the term "unconscious" (or, again, "non­
conscious") in many of the ways utilized by the Cartesian 
arguers trades on an equivocation between a sort of 
Freudian sense of the term (as in the sort of notion that 
one unconsciously hates one's sibling when one cannot 
articulate it), and a more full-blooded sense of me term 
which has the implication that one is unconscious only 
when one is asleep, in a coma or suffering from a head 
injury. The difficulty with the Cartesian arguments is that 
mey trade on these uses of the term, and do so rather 
shamelessly. Lynch notes this when he states mat 
" ....Carruthers confuses being conscious of something 
with paying attention to something of which one is 
already conscious." Again, I would push mis line of 
argument further, since it is clear that the uses of me 
terms "conscious" and "unconscious" are crucial to 
Carruthers' andHarrison's arguments. One cannotbe said 
to be driving "unconsciously." An unconscious individual 
cannot drive. Since driving does not, presumably, often 
evoke me sorts of trauma-generated conflicts of which 
me Freudians speak, it makes little sense to mink mat 
there are (in most cases) unconscious defense 
mechanisms that prevent one's paying attention to the 
freeway exit when one is driving. Although me English 
language perhaps lacks a vocabulary adequate to a full 
description of mese activities, much of routine driving is 
best captured, I argue, by expressions such as "semi­
conscious" or "not fully aware." Thus I substantiate 
Lynch's claim mat the Cartesians are misusing tl1ese 
terms; I simply want also to assert that this constitutes a 
ratl1er grave level ofmisuse and is, in fact, an instance of 
an informal fallacy. 
Oddly enough, as Lynch also notes, there is some 
sense actually attachable to tl1e notion of "unconscious 
pain." I would flesh out this assertion by suggesting 
tllat tl1e best tRke on this would probably be something 
along the lines of the autonomic responses in which 
the nervous system engages when a patient is 
anestl1etized for surgery, and so forth. Thus me headache 
example, as constructed, is clearly not an "unconscious 
headache." When one is distracted from one's headache, 
one cannot be said to be unconscious, nor can me 
headache ever completely disappear from one's level 
of awareness. All of mis bolsters Lynch's contention 
that " .. .it is normally difficult to account for pain 
behavior in tl1e absence of tl1e experience of pain." 
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Most importantly, perhaps, I agree with Lynch on 
the use of the notion of"second-order state" as an index 
of consciousness, and again I feel that, if anything, 
Prof. Lynch has been too generous to his opponents. 
There seems to be a profound speciesism involved in 
this talk of higher-order states, since it is clear that the 
capacity for what we normally count as such states is 
indeed related to the capacity for language. Part of 
what has made the claims about the great apes' 
linguistic abilities controversial to some is the notion 
that an ape such as Koko could pun or engage in 
activities that require a generalization over signs rather 
than an attempt to link a sign to a signified.(Penny 
Patterson of Stanford has reported that Koko has the 
ability to engage in a number of meta-linguistic 
activities.) Lynch acknowledges this when he says that 
"Carruthers shares a widely held philosophical opinion 
that the capacity to think is dependent upon the capacity 
to use language." The strongest counter to the notion 
that consciousness must be defined in terms of the 
capacity for second-order thought in some way that we 
would ordinarily call biconditional comes from our 
observations of the behavior of infants and very small 
children. Here few adult humans would deny the 
attribution of consciousness, even though it is clear, 
because of the lack of language use, that it makes little 
sense to attribute sophisticated levels of intentionality. 
Thus the same kinds of considerations that cause 
concern for the thirteen-month-old should cause 
concern for our dog, even though neither, ex hypothesi, 
holds second-order beliefs about the noxious 
phenomena. Lynch asserts something similar when he 
ends his paper by noting that"... the writhing and 
screams of a one-year-old child, or a lamb... " could 
only be ignored by philosophers. 
Carruthers and Harrison both make rather extreme 
claims. Of the alleged non-conscious experience of 
pain, Carruthers notes, "It feels like nothing."l He also 
claims, as Lynch notes, that" ... conscious experiences 
are those which are available to conscious thinkings."2 
Harrison actually goes so far as to say that "Properly 
programmed, such a machine [a robot] would manifest 
its own pain behavior."3 
In general, then, I support Prof. Lynch in both of his 
major lines of counterargument, while contending that 
each line can be bolstered and each major strand made 
to do more damage. The blatant misuse of terms having 
to do with mental states by both of the Cartesian authors 
constitutes a deliberate instance of equivocation-the 
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misuse of the terms is obvious, whether one takes them 
to be used in the colloquial, ordinary-language sense, 
or in some more recondite and technical sense. The 
contention, following along with the assertions made 
by some in philosophy of mind, that a conscious state 
must be the object of some second-order intentional 
state if it is to count as conscious, could only have been 
made by the language-intoxicated and runs counter to 
our everyday experience of life, not only with respect 
to nonhumans but with respect to small humans as well. 
Animals, young humans and those who lack language 
should indeed be objects of our moral concern. Another 
level of concern should be expressed for those who 
abuse terminology. 
Notes 
I Carruthers, "Brute Experience," p. 259. 
2 Ibid., p. 264. 
3 Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain?," p. 27. 
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